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Abstract
Data derived from the plethora of networked digital devices hold great potential for public benefit. Among these, mobile phone
call detail records (CDRs) present novel opportunities for research and are being used in a variety of health geography studies.
Research suggests that the public is amenable to the use of anonymized CDRs for research; however, further work is needed to
show that such data can be used appropriately. This study works toward an ethically founded data governance framework with
social acceptability. Using a multifaceted approach, this study draws upon data governance arrangements in published health
research using CDRs, with a consideration of public views and the public’s information expectations from mobile network
operators, and data use scenarios of CDRs in health research. The findings were considered against a backdrop of legislative and
regulatory requirements. CDRs can be used at various levels of data and geographic granularity and may be integrated with
additional, publicly available or restricted datasets. As such, there may be a significant risk of identity disclosure, which must be
mitigated with proportionate control measures. An indicative relative risk of the disclosure model is proposed to aid this process.
Subsequently, a set of recommendations is presented, including the need for greater transparency, accountability, and incorporation
of public views for social acceptability. This study addresses the need for greater clarity and consistency in data governance for
CDRs in health research. While recognizing the need to protect commercial interests, we propose that these recommendations
be used to contribute toward an ethically founded practical framework to promote the safe, socially acceptable use of CDR data
for public benefit. This pattern needs to be repeated for the appropriate use of new and emerging data types from other networking
devices and the wider internet of things.
(JMIR Mhealth Uhealth 2019;7(3):e11969)   doi:10.2196/11969
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Introduction
Background
The number of mobile connections, including the internet of
things (IoT), already exceeds the world population and is rapidly
approaching 9 billion [1]. It is difficult to find an adequate
adjective to represent the magnitude of data being generated as
we go about our daily lives. This number will only increase
with further technological developments and major investments.
Apart from smartphones, advances in smart homes, smart cities,
and autonomous vehicles; immersive technologies such as
virtual and augmented reality; and wider applications of artificial
intelligence are all increasing in permeation [2]. Data derived
from our use of the plethora of increasingly connected digital
devices hold great potential for public benefit as well as for
generating massive income and contributing to economic
growth. There is much debate over the definition of public
benefit. We define it here as work having real-world value or
practical application, with the clear potential to improve the life
of individuals or wider society [3]. With such rapidly developing
technologies and their societal impact, it is imperative that
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principles are in place for proper data governance, and such
principles are lagging behind the advancing pace [2]. In a
seminal paper, Letouzé and colleagues observed the need for
mobile phone data, when they noted the absence of a clear
holistic ethical and regulatory framework to guide research
using call detail records (CDRs) [4].
CDRs are generated passively each time a mobile phone user
connects to a mobile network, either by voice call or text
message. CDRs are collected irrespective of whether the user
has a standard mobile phone or a smartphone that functions as
a small personal computer with internet access, social media
connectivity, apps, games, etc. The record includes the starting
time of the call (or message), its duration, the caller’s and
receiver’s phone numbers, and their locations. Locations are
estimated from the positions of activated cell towers, but more
precise locations can be generated through tower triangulation
and Wifi connections. Mobile network operators (MNOs)
receive billions of CDRs globally and use them for billing,
monitoring data usage, and understanding and targeting
customers according to their mobile phone use [5].
Mobile phone CDRs present novel opportunities for research
and are being used in a variety of health geography studies. In
a recently published article, we reviewed the wide uses of CDRs
and showed their benefits in research across many countries,
particularly low- and middle-income countries where mobile
phones are a lifeline due to the lack of landline connections and
population administrative systems [5]. Examples include cholera
surveillance in Haiti and the Ivory Coast [6,7], air pollution in
Italy [8], visitor movement to monitor malaria in Zanzibar [9],
and dengue epidemics in Pakistan [10]. We also conducted
research with the public to gain their views on the use of mobile
phone CDRs for health research. This indicated that people are
content for their anonymous CDRs to be used in research,
provided that appropriate safeguards are in place. However,
study participants highlighted that the terms and conditions
should be clearer, as should information to phone users on data
collection, sharing, and uses in research [11].
Collating these ideas, our aim was to work toward an ethically
founded framework for the socially acceptable use of mobile
phone CDRs, particularly in health research. We propose that
the design and findings of this study will have value in
developing data governance guidelines for other areas of
research using CDRs for public benefit and wider network
applications. As such, in addition to MNOs and the research
community, our target audience includes policy makers; funding
bodies; ethical, scientific, and publication review committees;
and others involved in shaping how person-based data are used
and protected.
Approach
This study is based on a multifaceted approach that draws upon
data governance arrangements in published health research
using CDRs; public engagement and their information
expectations from mobile operators; and data use scenarios of
CDRs for health research, all against a backdrop of legislative
and regulatory requirements.
We first briefly outline the legislative and regulatory backdrop
to set the scene. The current European (EU) legislation for
personal data and their usage is the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) 2016 (2016/679/EU) that came into force
in May 2018 [12]. Other jurisdictions have similar legislation,
and in addition, may have specific legislation such as the Privacy
and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations
2003 (2002/58/EC) [13]. Essential to these frameworks is the
requirement to use personal data within lawful provisions and
to safeguard individual privacy. Importantly, the GDPR
encompasses pseudonymized data in its scope of personal data.
This is defined as follows:
Pseudonymisation means the processing of personal
data in such a manner that the personal data can no
longer be attributed to a specific data subject without
the use of additional information, provided that such
additional information is kept separately and is
subject to technical and organisational measures to
ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an
identified or identifiable natural person. [13]
This means that it is not necessarily sufficient to remove the
commonly recognized identifiers from a dataset to render it
anonymous, which will therefore have a bearing on the
lawfulness of CDR data usage. Where data are not fully
anonymous, general data processing can be carried out lawfully,
provided that it can be justified under (at least) one of the
provisions in Article 6 [12]. Crucially, although many
jurisdictions have privacy legislation and regulations, they are
often mutually inconsistent as a geographically bounded
patchwork. This misalignment is problematic for networked
operations, since they are necessarily international operations
[14].
In addition to complying with all relevant legislation, data uses
are found to abide by ethical principles with respect to
individuals and the public. The Menlo report [15] set out four
important principles for computer and information-security
research, namely, beneficence, respect for persons, justice, and
respect for the law and public interest. This report was important
in shaping our study because it set out to show the new potential
for risks to individual privacy with the expansion of information
and communications technology-based research, unless there
is a corresponding reinterpretation of ethical principles and their
application, to provide the groundwork for ethically defensible
research [15]. The four principles were explained by Letouzé
[4] to demonstrate their relevance to CDR research:
1. Beneficence: understanding risks and benefits. Efforts
should be made to maximize the probability and magnitude
of research benefits while recognizing that the risks and
benefits in using CDRs are not always immediately apparent
and will depend on specific project objectives. Furthermore,
commercial considerations need to be taken into account
when framing the work.
2. Respect for persons. The issue of consent is gaining
attention among privacy concerns on using and sharing
CDR data. In general, there appears to be little provision
to allow consumers to exclude unwanted uses of their data.
Going forward, this issue should be considered, particularly
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with legislative changes due to the introduction of the
GDPR.
3. Justice: bias and inequalities. This principle highlights the
issues of equality and fairness in how risks and benefits are
distributed. It is known that not everyone is able to
contribute data and benefit from research using CDRs.
Efforts should be made to understand and correct biases in
CDR data to ensure that the findings are representative of
society.
4. Respect for the law and public interest. There is a need to
engage properly in legal due diligence. In addition, there
is an ethical position to support social acceptability. This
includes being transparent about how CDR data are
collected, shared, and used and being accountable for
actions taken.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
guidelines set out eight principles for fair information practices.
Briefly, these cover data collection limitations, data quality and
relevance, purpose specification, data use limitations, security
safeguards, openness, data subject rights, and accountability
[16]. These principles, set out in 2012, are highly relevant to
research using CDRs and other networked data, where as yet,
there is no overarching ethical framework to safeguard
individuals.
A review of the data governance arrangements in published
studies was included in the design of our recent review [5]. The
level of available detail varied, but we aimed to state whether
data were anonymized or aggregated, the approval processes,
and the data access arrangements. The purpose of this exercise
was to assess current reported practice and learn from good
examples. Although the majority of the studies we reviewed [5]
used data from low- and middle-income countries, the
researchers using the data were multinational, and MNOs
operate internationally across jurisdictional boundaries. The
public view on the use of CDRs for health research is an
underresearched area, and our study is the only one known to
date [11]. We draw upon the series of workshops we conducted
with the public to incorporate their views into proposals for the
ethical use of CDRs in research. There were four workshops;
the first was a pilot (N=25) to inform the three subsequent
groups (N=61 each). All the workshops were based in Wales,
United Kingdom, and included a range of general public
participants. Two were held at Swansea University and one at
a further education college. The format included an initial
questionnaire to gauge knowledge, a presentation of research
using CDRs, a discussion of risks and benefits, and an exit
questionnaire to assess postworkshop views.
In addition to relying on published research using CDRs, we
created scenarios of CDR use with and without additional
datasets in order to develop an indicative relative disclosure risk
model. These were selected in discussion with local Health
Board staff and based on questions of potential interest to the
Board. There is a wealth of literature on anonymization and
disclosure risk, drawing attention to the fact that just because
data have been through a process of anonymization, they might
not be immune to reidentification risks. We used the principles
in the Anonymisation Decision-Making Framework [17] to
model the likely disclosure risks in our example scenarios. These
principles take into account factors including dataset size, data
accessibility (open vs controlled), data granularity, user
knowledge, means available, and motivation. This guidance,
discussions with Health Board staff, and our knowledge of
working with data informed the development of the model. We
then analyzed findings from a review [5], the public views [11],
and the data use scenarios to propose a set of recommendations
for the appropriate use of CDRs in health research.
Results and Discussion
Data Governance Arrangements in Published Studies
The extensive structured literature review on the use of mobile
phone CDR data for health research revealed some common
patterns in operational data governance regimes [5]. Datasets
were provided to researchers at different levels of spatial
granularity and over variously restricted time periods to mitigate
risks. These varied by study or programs of study. In some
cases, data were subjected to several layers of anonymization,
and the true geolocations of cell phone masts were masked. The
use of anonymized (or strongly pseudonymized) data was the
norm, with few studies outside this model and with many
additionally using aggregation and suppression of rare or
extreme records. However, researchers reported that the use of
overstringent measures sometimes precluded some potentially
valuable research analyses. The requirement for formal ethical
review varied, but proposals were routinely submitted to an
internal ethics workgroup, and, in some cases, to an independent
external group for wider considerations such as political
implications, societal benefits, and risk versus utility. There
were no known privacy breaches in relation to the data supplied
for the studies included in the review [5].
The MNO Orange issued a Data for Development Challenge
on mobile phone data based on 5 million Ivory Coast customers’
data over a 4-month period [18]. Researchers were tasked with
using the data in a way that could potentially contribute to the
socioeconomic development of the country. CDRs were
anonymized by Orange Ivory Coast and processed by Orange
Labs in Paris. In addition, the geographical locations of the cell
phone masts were masked to protect the commercial interests
of Orange. Four datasets of differing granularities were then
released to researchers: (1) tower-to-tower data for the number
and duration of calls between a pair of towers aggregated by
each hour; (2) high spatial resolution data of individual
movement trajectories on a random sample of 50,000 individuals
for a 2-week time period only; (3) similar data for the entire
observation period but with reduced spatial resolution to reduce
the likelihood of identification; and (4) social network subgraphs
using the CDRs generated by 5000 randomly selected
individuals, divided into 2-week time periods [18]. A similar
process was followed when Orange issued a second challenge,
this time using data from Senegal. Orange established two ethics
groups to review the proposals for data use: an internal ethics
workgroup and an external panel of international experts [19,20].
For studies not involved with the Orange challenges,
anonymized data were provided by the MNO apart from one
study wherein researchers were provided with a raw dataset and
undertook the anonymization process themselves [21]. High-
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and low-volume users were excluded from the analyses of this
study to protect privacy. Another study stated that they followed
the Groupe Spéciale Mobile Association privacy guidelines,
which advise that any analyses on mobile phone records should
be done using deidentified data and that individual-level data
should not leave the MNO servers [22]. In this case, the data
were analyzed remotely, and only aggregated data were released
externally. Other studies explicitly stated that they used only
aggregated data in their analyses. Where studies used additional
datasets, they tended to integrate these with, or overlay them
onto, the CDRs rather than use individual-level data linkage.
In addition to ethical review by the MNO (where present), some
studies reported seeking additional ethical approval from their
institution before beginning their research study.
Pubic Views and Concerns
A variety of concerns about CDR usage were expressed during
the public workshops. Participants were worried about location
data being sold to (potential) employers or insurers and the risk
of disclosure for individuals living in remote areas. There were
questions about whether data were being anonymized and
aggregated to a sufficient standard and whether informed consent
had been gained for identifiable data to be collected in the first
place. Perceived risks included disclosure and data misuse and
the increased possibility of reidentification from the use of
multiple datasets. Participants made suggestions for what could
be done to address these concerns; the most frequent was to
have transparent terms and conditions, followed by provision
of more information to phone users on the types of data being
collected and how they are used. Stronger information
governance featured highly, with a need for more legal sanctions
for data misuse, the option to opt out, and the provision of more
information on governance and security processes. The majority
felt that information about the use of anonymized mobile phone
data for research should be included in the terms and conditions
[11].
Relative Risk Model for Use of Call Detail Records
Data modeling exercises using semihypothetical scenarios were
carried out to suggest a relative risk model for using CDRs in
conjunction with publicly available or restricted access data.
We based this on the information about CDR use from our
review, as we did not have access to these data. The assessments
took into account a number of assumptions. In terms of
anticipated benefits, it is acknowledged that a phone might be
carried by someone other than the contract holder and any MNO
population coverage is partial; therefore, these issues may affect
generalizability. Additionally, at least some of the research
questions could be addressed by means other than using CDR
data. However, the use of mobile phone data is an emerging
area of work and presents novel opportunities, the full extent
of which has not yet been realized. The outcome of the data
modeling exercises is an indicative model, as it is not possible
to assess absolute risk from this process. The risk estimates are
based on the concept of reasonable effort, rather than what could
be ascertained by a highly motivated, malicious intruder, but
they do factor in potential repercussions due to the release of
CDR data. We used six types of scenarios for illustration, some
based on macro CDR data and some based on small-cell CDR
data, but of course, other combinations are possible. Macro
CDR location data are based on tower-to-tower communications
and triangulation. Small cells are devices placed by MNOs
within venues to capture local granularity, for example, inside
a building or shopping mall. The scenarios were macro CDR
data alone, small-cell CDR data alone, macro CDRs with
publicly available datasets, small-cell CDRs with publicly
available datasets, macro CDRs with restricted-access datasets,
and small-cell CDR data with restricted-access datasets. It is
assumed that all data are used in anonymized form, but in
practice, MNOs often also aggregate the data for further risk
mitigation. Publicly available datasets (such as weather,
pollution levels, or disease incidence) are taken as aggregated.
Restricted-access datasets (such as health records from hospitals
or primary care) may be anonymized or aggregated depending
on permissions and approvals. Details of the scenarios with their
likely indicative risk profiles are shown in Multimedia Appendix
1. Considering these scenarios, we suggest the following relative
disclosure risks:
1. Macro CDR data: It is considered highly unlikely that the
majority of studies based solely on macro-level CDR data
would present a significant risk to individual or group
identity disclosure. There is a small possibility that the
identity of some individuals in a dataset could be
compromised through the use of location data patterns in
CDRs, but this would require significant specialist effort.
Provided that extreme records or very rare conditions/events
are excluded, the risks of macro CDR–based studies should
be low.
2. Small-cell CDR data: The sole use of small-cell CDR data
in research studies is considered unlikely to present a
significant risk to individual or group identity disclosure,
unless particular groups, rare/sensitive conditions, or rare
events are being studied. Because of the small geographies
involved, the risks of working with small-cell CDR–based
data are likely to be low or low-moderate, depending on
the nature of the study.
3. Macro CDR data with publicly available datasets: The use
of macro CDR data in conjunction with publicly available
datasets is considered unlikely to present significant risk to
individual or group identity disclosure, unless particular
groups, rare/sensitive conditions, or rare events are being
studied via the association of more than one temporospatial
dataset. The indicative risk level is therefore considered to
be low-moderate.
4. Small-cell CDR data with publicly available datasets: It is
considered that the use of small-cell CDR data in
conjunction with publicly available datasets may present
significant risk to individual or group identity disclosure.
This is because, although the data are not linked at the
individual level, it may be possible to associate the datasets
temporospatially and thus to home in on small number (or
individual) records due to the use of specific locations. The
indicative risk level is therefore considered to be moderate.
5. Macro CDR data with restricted-access datasets: The use
of macro CDR data in conjunction with restricted-access
datasets is considered likely to present significant risk to
individual or group identity disclosure. This is because of
the sensitivity and granularity of the restricted-access data
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(such as general practice or hospital records), even if the
data are not linked at the individual level. The model of
access for the use of such combinations of data should be
given serious consideration, with access within a data-safe
haven likely to provide greater safeguards than external
data release. The indicative risk level is therefore considered
to be moderate to high.
6. Small-cell CDR data with restricted-access datasets: This
scenario is similar to point number 5 mentioned above, but
presents greater risks because of the use of small-cell CDR
data in conjunction with restricted-access datasets. As such,
it is considered highly likely to present significant risk to
individual or group identity disclosure. This is because more
specific locations are used along with individual health
records, and consequently, access to such combinations of
data should be given the utmost consideration. The
indicative risk level is considered to be high.
The resulting indicative relative disclosure risk model is shown
in Table 1.
Recommendations for the Use of Call Detail Records
for Public Benefit
Drawing the information together from the combined findings
of the review [5], public views [11], and data use scenarios, we
propose the following recommendations to promote the safe,
socially acceptable use of mobile phone CDR data for public
benefit. While recognizing the need to protect commercial
interests, we propose that these interests be taken into
consideration to contribute toward an ethically founded practical
framework for developmental initiatives and research programs
involving the use of CDR data wherever the work takes place.
These recommendations are for MNOs and stakeholders—all
the people involved in shaping how CDR data are used and
protected:
1. The anticipated public benefit of the proposed data use
should be clearly articulated and be sufficient to justify the
potential risks of harm to data subjects.
2. All relevant legislative, regulatory, and governance
approvals and data provider permissions should be sought
with due diligence at the planning stage to ensure
compliance.
3. Clear information (embodied in contract, as necessary)
should be provided to stakeholders on expectations and
responsibilities. This should include a description of the
proposal, the placement of any small cells, and likely risks
and benefits, so that informed decisions can be made by
responsible parties.
4. Public views and preferences should be taken into account,
beyond the strict requirements of legislation, to promote
inclusivity and social license in the use of CDR data.
5. Learning from other initiatives and sharing good practice
in data governance for the use of CDRs should be an
ongoing process to avoid ethical pitfalls.
6. Due regard should be paid to modeling likely risks in
research scenarios using CDR data with or without
additional datasets on a case-by-case basis, so that
appropriate safeguards at data access and release of results
can be applied accordingly.
7. Transparency should be a fundamental consideration when
communicating the likely risks and benefits of CDR data
usage, including anticipated public benefit and lessons
learned to inform future work.
8. Efforts should be made to engage with the public to provide
information on the research uses of CDR data, potential
public benefits, and possible opportunities to be involved
in influencing the research agenda.
9. The terms and conditions of service should be made more
accessible and clearer to data subjects in terms of design
and content as part of a transparent data governance model.
10. The use of the best quality data at a granularity that enables
the research question to be addressed without compromising
privacy and security should be promoted.
11. Appropriate privacy notices on what data are collected; in
which formats they are used; and for what purposes, by
whom, and to whom they are sold/shared should be
provided.
12. A high priority should be placed on having a robust, flexible
data governance framework and being overtly accountable
and responsible across all operations pertaining to the use
of person-based data.
Table 1. Indicative relative disclosure risk model.
Indicative levelImplicationData
LowHighly unlikely to present a significant risk to individual or group identity disclo-
sure
Macro CDRa data alone
Low-moderateUnlikely to present a significant risk to individual or group identity disclosureSmall-cell CDR data alone
Low-moderateUnlikely to present a significant risk to individual or group identity disclosureMacro CDR data with publicly available
datasets
ModerateMay present a significant risk to individual or group identity disclosureSmall-cell CDR data with publicly available
datasets
Moderate-highLikely to present a significant risk to individual or group identity disclosureMacro CDR data with restricted datasets
HighHighly likely to present a significant risk to individual or group identity disclosureSmall-cell CDR data with restricted datasets
aCDR: call detail record
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Summary Discussion
CDRs have been used successfully in a wide variety of health
geography studies, with varying data governance regimes.
Engagement with the public drew out valuable issues on the
social acceptability of using CDRs in research. The relative risk
model sets out a hierarchy of likely disclosure in different data
use scenarios. Although this is only indicative, it can be used
as a guide to inform data use proposals on a case-by-case basis.
The resulting set of recommendations is a culmination of all
aspects of the work to contribute to a framework for the safe,
socially acceptable use of CDRs in research. Concerns have
been raised regarding the ethics of using mobile phone data in
research and the potential threat to privacy. This, for the most
part, has stemmed from the absence of any clear ethical and
regulatory framework to guide this type of research and the use
of networked data more broadly [4,14]. The recommendations
can be taken forward to address this identified lack of
consistency. These recommendations are in accordance with
the Menlo and Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development guidance [15,16] and consolidate their principles
to add specific guidance in relation to the use of CDR data for
research by adding the previously nonexistent evidence base
gained via a review of data governance in published research,
modeling risks in data use scenarios, and importantly,
incorporating public views on the social acceptability of CDR
data use.
Most published research reported results using anonymized
data, and many went further to protect against reidentification
by way of aggregation. Nevertheless, examples of how
anonymization and aggregation do not guarantee privacy are
abundant in the literature [23-27]. Moreover, breaches in group
privacy do not rely on the reidentification of individuals. People
who belong to certain groups on the basis of their gender, sexual
orientation, ethnicity, or political preferences could become
visible in CDR data and targeted [4,28]. Anonymization is a
key concept in data protection legislation, and anonymized data
are generally considered as data from which the data subject is
no longer identifiable. However, the bar is set high in relation
to the potential for reidentification and the risks related to this
possibility. The essence of the EU GDPR is that if a data
controller retains the key to reidentifying the data subject, the
information should be more accurately considered
pseudonymized rather than anonymized [29]. This has
implications for the use of CDRs, as such data remain within
the scope of the legislation. Depending on how the data are held
and managed, it may be necessary for a data controller to justify
that the data governance safeguards are in place and for the
costs and effort involved in reidentification to be so remote or
disproportionate that the data are effectively anonymized. This
should include a consideration of physical, technical, and
procedural controls around the data, for privacy by design, as
well as controls applied directly to the data [17]. It is also
important to consider the point at which data are anonymized
and where this anonymization takes place. Data controllers have
to comply with the GDPR if their work uses data pertaining to
EU citizens, irrespective of whether their organization is based
within the EU [13]. The GDPR also includes a requirement for
transparent privacy notices on how data are collected and used,
with relevant opt outs that are as easy to reverse as they are to
agree [30]. As identified via our public workshops, clear,
user-friendly, noncoercive information should be provided in
the terms and conditions [11]. Furthermore, because of the finer
granularity in data collection and possible risks, privacy notices
should also be considered in locations where small cells are
sited.
Proper ethical and societal principles are important for the use
of person-based data, even when the data have been anonymized.
Whichever data are to be used, due diligence should always be
applied to ensure the proposed data uses are appropriate and
safe. Generation of a digital footprint via active and passive
data collection is increasing both in volume and scope. Mobile
phones are among the most longstanding of networked devices,
but many other data sources are coming to the fore via the IoT
and other data-hungry advances [2]. It has been noted that when
using our phones and other devices, we are trading our privacy
for convenience, with many people finding the conventions of
interaction obscure or inexplicable [31]. It has further been
argued that with the increase in networked devices and the
cultural and functional changes impacting society, as individuals,
we will find ourselves in an “ethical bind” where we need to
use the device, but cannot do so without surrendering data to
the network [32]. Although it is appreciated that certain data
are necessary for MNOs and other operators, there needs to be
an ethical balance, so that individuals are not overlooked and
treated as a commodity. For this reason, we need appropriate
ethically founded data-governance frameworks with social
acceptability in order to respect individual choice and use data
for public benefit [17].
What This Study Adds
This is the first-known study to use a multifaceted approach to
propose recommendations for the ethically founded use of CDRs
in research. Our findings are based on known practice in CDR
use, public viewpoints, and a consideration of relative risk in
data use scenarios. As such, it is a novel study that can be used
as a model for other new and emerging personal data types in
the increasingly networked digital world.
Limitations
The main limitations of this study are related to the scenarios
for data modelling, since we were unable to access the data in
order to make a quantifiable risk assessment. This could be a
topic for future work. However, it is worth pointing out that
accurately quantifying disclosure risk from data use scenarios
is not a trivial exercise, since it varies with many factors. As
such, while recognizing that our model is only indicative, we
recommend that data use proposals are assessed for risk on a
case-by-case basis, making use of the principles proposed. In
addition, although we chose to illustrate the model with six
scenarios, other combinations are also possible. This could
include a consideration of different health conditions, data
volumes and granularities, access conditions, and other variables.
Conclusions
This study has addressed the identified need for greater clarity
and consistency in data governance for mobile phone CDRs in
research. While recognizing that it is important to protect
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commercial interests, we propose that the recommendations be
used to contribute toward an ethically founded practical
framework to promote the safe socially acceptable use of CDR
data for public benefit. With the increase in passive and active
data collection from individuals using networked devices, this
pattern needs to be repeated for the appropriate use of new and
emerging data types from other applications and the wider IoT.
Future work should consolidate these findings to assess the
value of the recommendations as part of an ethically founded
data-governance framework for the use of mobile phone CDR
data and their wider applicability.
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